Washington Law Review
Volume 51
Number 3 Symposium: Law and the
Correctional Process in Washington
7-1-1976

Good Intentions Gone Awry—A Proposal for Fundamental Change
in Criminal Sentencing
Christopher T. Bayley

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher T. Bayley, Good Intentions Gone Awry—A Proposal for Fundamental Change in Criminal
Sentencing, 51 Wash. L. Rev. 529 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol51/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

GOOD INTENTIONS GONE AWRY-A
PROPOSAL FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Christopher T. Bayley*

Within the American criminal justice system, one theory-that of
rehabilitation-has emerged from traditional principles of sentencing'
as the dominant theme in criminal dispositions. 2 Characterized as the
"individual treatment model," it suggests that tailoring the sentence to
the offender's individual needs will result in rehabilitation and will
thereby facilitate society's ultimate goal of public protection. 3 This
fundamentally optimistic social theory assumes that the individual is
not responsible for his criminality, but that he is suffering from a
combination of social and personality disorders which have led to
criminal acts and which can be overcome by stimulating inherent positive qualities. Proponents of this theory link the criminal act to such
* King County Prosecuting Attorney, Seattle, Washington; B.A., 1960, Harvard
College; J.D., 1966, Harvard Law School.
1. The most frequently articulated justifications for criminal sentencing are deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. See generally S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1, 6-39 (3d ed. 1975).
2. Many decisions clearly evidence the insistence of the sentencing judge that the
sentence be "individualized" in keeping with the character of the offender. See, e.g.,
United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v. Green,
396 Pa. 137, 150, 151 A.2d 241, 247 (1959). See also Ringold, A Judge's Personal
Perspective on Criminal Sentencing, 51 WASH. L. REV. 631 (1976). The Model
Sentencing Act rejects retribution and adopts rehabilitation as the purpose of sentencing: "Persons convicted of crime shall be dealt with in accordance with their potential
for rehabilitation, considering their individual characteristics, circumstances and

needs."

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,

ADVISORY COUNCIL OF

JUDGES, MODEL SENTENCING ACT I (2d ed. 1972).
3. Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has reflected on this model:
Rehabilitation must be the goal of modern corrections. Every other consideration should be subordinated to it. To rehabilitate is to give health, freedom from
drugs and alcohol, to provide education, vocational training, understanding and the
ability to contribute to society.
Rehabilitation means the purpose of law is justice--and that as a generous people we wish to give every individual his chance for fulfillment. The theory of rehabilitation is based on the belief that healthy rational people will not injure
others, that they will understand that the individual and his society are best served
by conduct that does not inflict injury, and that a just society has the ability to
provide health and purpose and opportunity for all its citizens. Rehabilitated, an
individual will not have the capacity-cannot bring himself-to injure another or
take or destroy property.
R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 220 (1970).
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factors as the offender's home life, education, peer group interaction,
vocational skills, and racial experience. Thus, the model is virtually
medical, identifying crime as a larger social and personal disorder that
can be identified, isolated, and cured. This article will discuss the individual treatment model and analyze the fallacies of current sentencing
practices and philosophies. Concluding that the treatment model is
inappropriate because it fails to consider fundamental principles of
justice and the purposes of the criminal law, it will offer an alternative
proposal for sentencing that is not dependent on the theory of rehabilitation.
I.

THE INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT MODEL

At each stage of the correctional process the focus of the individual
treatment model is on fashioning a remedy to meet the offender's
needs. Initially, a judge employing this philosophy attempts to amass
as much data as possible about the defendant. 4 With the information
available, the judge makes the first crucial decision: whether to create
a "program" of probation, with conditions and expectations to be fulfilled by the offender, or whether to implement the sentence by incar5
ceration of the individual.
Theoretically, selection of probation results from an understanding
of the defendant and the conclusion that completion of the prescribed
program will mean the amelioration of the underlying disease or conditions which led to the criminal act. The judge, interpreting the accumulated data, then analyzes how the defendant's life should be
reshaped to prevent him from committing future crimes. Once sentenced to probation, the offender is required to follow its terms under
threat of traditional punishment. The prescribed cure is expected to
work either because the defendant is anxious to be granted the opportunity of probation, or because he is coerced to comply with its conditions, notwithstanding his attitude toward them. For a probationer,
punishment is the ultimate threat, but it is viewed as "a tool" to insure
rehabilitation rather than as a goal or purpose of the sentence.,
4. See generally Ringold, supra note 2. for a discussion of defendant characteristics
considered by a judge in imposing a sentence.
5. For a description of these initial "sentencing" decisions see Comment. A Perspective on Adult Corrections in Washington, 51 WASH. L. REV. 495 (1976).
6. The Honorable Donald J. Horowitz. King County Superior Court judge. writes:
"Punishment does have a place in the system. but not as a goal; rather as a tool to
correct." Protectionof the Public, 29 WASH. B. NEws JulylAugust 1975. at 10, 14.
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If the offender is imprisoned, parole boards and prison personnel
have their own individual treatment mechanism-the indeterminate
sentence. 7 Under this system of sentencing, the offender is incarcerated for an unspecified length of time; release prior to the legislatively
prescribed maximum term is conditioned upon his responsiveness to
the environment or evidence of cure. Under this theory, the "quickly
rehabilitated" prisoner should not continue to suffer in an institution,
and the recalcitrant person who can not .or will not change should
remain institutionalized. Release prior to the expiration of the maximum term can occur only when "rehabilitation has been complete." 8
Thus, the individualized treatment model views imprisonment and
punishment as strategies for behavioral modification. There is little
consideration of punishment as an expression of public denunciation
for antisocial acts or of deterrent purposes of the law. A growing
number of critics have emerged, however, to challenge this model and
its assumptions. 9 They suggest that the individual treatment model is
dangerous and fundamentally unfair to offenders, that it has failed to
rehabilitate, and that it sacrifices the deterrent value of the criminal
law.
A.

The Justice Argument

The rehabilitative ideal and the acceptance of a philosophy of criminal disposition that concentrates almost exclusively on the needs of
the individual offender conflict with certain fundamental principles of
jugtice. Society has eagerly embraced a seemingly more humane
system of criminal law that no longer explicitly Punishes the criminal
for his crime but attempts to cure him of his criminality. In so doing,
however, issues such as the need to limit the powers of the state over
the individual and the requirements of consistency and objectivity in
sentencing have largely been ignored. The notion of punishment carries harsh connotations of revenge and pointless cruelty. It is certainly
more comfortable to speak of treatment, correction, or even "ware7.

For a definition and examination of the various models of indeterminate sentenc-

ing see Reid, A Rebuttal to the Attack on the Indeterminate Sentence, 51 WASH. L.

REV.565 (1976).
8. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.100 (1974), which provides in part: '"The
board [of prison terms and paroles] shall not, however, until his maximum term expires, release a prisoner, unless in its opinion his rehabilitation has been complete and
he is a fit subject for release."
9. See note 17 infra.
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housing for the protection of society" than it is to speak of punishment. This approach, however, introduces a note of hypocrisy into the
system and leads to dangerous expansion of the power of the state
over the individual.
1.

Treatment as punishment

The simple labeling of sentences as "treatment" does not necessarily
mean that they cease to be punishment as well. As one commentator
has suggested:1 0
It has become fashionable to reject the unpleasant word "punishment" when talking about rehabilitation. . . . However benevolent
the purpose of reform, however better off we expect its object to be,

there is no blinking the fact that what we do to the offender in the
name of reform is being done to him by compulsion and for our sake,
not for his. Rehabilitation may be the most humane goal of punishment, but it is a goal of punishment so long as its invocation depends
upon finding that an offense has been committed, and so long as its
object is to prevent the commission of offenses.

Thus, treatment under coercion intrinsically involves an element of
punishment. This does not imply that all treatments are inhumane.
Because they are all coerced, however, it is inappropriate to use the
benevolent rhetoric of treatment terminology.1
If treatment inescapably involves this element of punishment, the
question arises as to the appropriateness of punishing individuals according to society's perception of their needs. The critical flaw in this
treatment model is that it removes from punishment the essential element of "just desert." 12 As noted criminologist Norval Morris points
10. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 53-54 (1969) (emphasis
in original). Another commentator illustrates the seductive use of rehabilitation nomenclature: "In the same spirit some prisons are now called 'therapeutic correctional communities,' convicts are 'clients of the correctional system.' solitary confinement and
punishment cells have become 'adjustment centers,' 'seclusion.' or. in Virginia. 'medi-

tation."' J.

MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT

6 (1973). Too often, however, the

infliction of punishment is disguised as treatment. See generally id. chs. 7 & 8;
CAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM.. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter cited as

AMERIAIERI-

CAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM. ].

11. As one critic of such self-delusion observed: "Can the subject take it or leave
it? If he takes it. can he leave it any time he wants? If the answer to any of these

questions is 'No.' then the wolf is still under the sheepskin."

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV.

COMM., supra note 10. at 24.
12. C.S. Lewis. the noted English social critic, has observed: "[The concept of
desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice. It is only as de-

532

Proposal for Criminal Sentencing
out: "[T] he link between established crime and deserved suffering
. . . is a central precept of everyone's sense of justice or, to be more
precise, of everyone's sense of injustice ....
Proponents of the individualized treatment model respond to this
argument by challenging the appropriateness of the "just desert" concept. Many dismiss questions of justice as mere abstract and irrelevant
theorizing. Psychiatrist Karl Menninger, one of the fathers of 'the
modem treatment model, characterizes "justice" as, at worst, a construct which has been manipulated to tyrannize the criminal population, and at best, an unnecessary and outmoded barrier to the abilities
4
and aims of behavioral science.'
Menninger, however, fails to acknowledge the need to establish
limits to the coercive power of the state. He writes: 15
That he or she has broken the law gives us a technical reason for
acting on behalf of society to try to do something that will lead him to
act more acceptably, and which will protect the environment in the
meantime. And this is exactly what the present system based on the
concepts of justice and precedentfails to do.
For Menninger, this "technical reason" gives society virtually unlimited license to subject the offender to cure. It is not clear, however,
that society can 'rely on the benevolence of behavioral scientists,
judges, prosecutors, and other correctional officials who are willing to
served or undeserved that a punishment can be just or unjust." Tile Humanitarian
Theory of Punishment, in EsSAYS ON THE DEATH PENALTY 2-3 (T. Ingram ed. 1971).

13. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 75 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
MORRIS]. It is also worth emphasizing, as Morris does, that the term "desert" as used
in discussions of sentencing does not refer to a "salvation or ethics, admission to the
company of heaven or of men of virtue." Id. at 73. Rather, it is used in the social
context, as an assessment of "the minimum of punishment the convicted offender must
suffer if he is to be reaccepted as a member of society" and the maximum punishment
which could be considered proportional to the harm caused by the crime. Id. at 74.
14. He writes:
The very word justice irritates scientists. No surgeon expects to be asked if an
operation for cancer is just or not. No doctor will be reproached on the grounds
that the dose of penicillin he has prescribed is less than justice would stipulate.
Behavioral scientists regard it as equally absurd to invoke the question of justice
in deciding what to do with a woman who cannot resist her propensity to shoplift, or with a man who cannot repress an impulse to assault somebody. This sort
of behavior has to be controlled; it has to be discouraged; it has to be stopped.
This (to the scientist) is a matter of public safety and amicable coexistence, not
ofjustice.
K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 17 (1968) (emphasis in original). It should

be noted, however, that Dr. Menninger perhaps overestimates the effectiveness and
"exactness" of behavioral science.
15. Id. at 18 (emphasis in original).
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substitute "a technical reason for acting on behalf of society" for the
6
concept of justice and our historic concern for individual liberties.'
Questions such as how much "treatment" a shoplifter must undergo,
and what the limits to forms of cure will be, indicate the potential
dangers of benevolence combined with coercion.
Examples of the application of the rehabilitative ideal to the parole
decision in indeterminate sentencing systems have been documented
and criticized by numerous commentators, 17 and the injustices which
can result have been clearly evidenced in Washington.1 8 Less obvious,
16. A significant danger to American legal norms may be presented by those who
combine benevolence with coercion:
The obligation of containing power within the limits suggested by a community's political values has been considerably complicated by the rise of the rehabilitative ideal. For the problem today is one of regulating the exercise of power
by men of good will, whose motivations are to help not to injure, and whose ambitions are quite different from those of the political adventurer so familiar to history. There is a tendency for such persons to claim immunity from the usual
forms of restraint and to insist that professionalism and a devotion to science
provide sufficient protection against an unwarranted invasion of individual rights.
Allen. Legal Values and the Rehabilitation Ideal in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE CRIMINAL IN TiE ARMS OF TttE LAW 71 (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971). Allen

adds a mischievious but pertinent quotation from Aldous Huxley's Brave New World
Revisted. Mr. Huxley observes:
"There seems to be a touching belief among certain Ph.D's in sociology that Ph.D's
in sociology will never be corrupted by power. Like Sir Galahad's. their strength
is the strength of ten because their heart is pure-and their heart is pure because
they are scientists and have taken six thousand hours of social studies."
Id. quoting A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 34-35 (1958).
17. See, e.g., Citizens' Inquiry on Parole and Criminal Justice. Inc.. Report on
New York Parole: A Summary, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 273 (1975); AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERV. COMM., supra note 10, at 83-99; J. MITFORD, supra note 10, at 79-94; Dersho-

witz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 297 (1974).

18. Such injustices can be seen by contrasting the case of Bobbie Miller with other
recent sentencing dispositions. Miller was convicted of riding in a stolen motor vehicle.
knowing it to be stolen. He was 16 years old and had a history of delinquent acts but
had never been convicted of a crime as an adult. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
term of not more than ten years on March 21. 1958. Both the prosecuting attorney
and the sentencing judge recommended a minimum term of 18 months. The Board of
Prison Terms and Paroles. stating no reasons, set a minimum term of four years.
Through administrative action resulting from numerous violations of prison rules by
Miller (none of which involved a conviction for any new crime), his minimum term
was then extended to the full ten years. Only through legal action was Miller able to
secure his release after nine years in a reformatory and prison. Seattle Post-Intelligencer. Jan. 13, 1975, § A. at 7. col. 2 and March 18, 1975. § A, at 9, col. 2.
In contrast, the computer records of the King County Prosecutor show that of the
56 persons charged with taking and riding in 1975 who were later sentenced. 52 were
granted probation and four went to prison. Of those probationed. 30 did some jail
time (16 of these for less than 30 days) and 22 did no jail time at all. Criminal Sentencing Analysis for the Year 1975 (1975) (computer compilation on file with the King
County Prosecuting Attorney). In addition, Department of Social and Health Services
(DSHS) data indicate that for those paroled in 1973. the median length of stay for
auto theft offenders was 15.5 months. Wash. Dep't of Social and Health Services.
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but perhaps equally insidious, are probation conditions which attempt
to change the lifestyle of the offender to bring about a more acceptable, less crime-prone pattern. A court may proscribe association with
friends, demand steady employment, education, difficult confrontative therapy, or abstinence from alcohol as conditions of probation.
Aside from the practical problems of enforcing such conditions and
their highly questionable effectiveness in controlling crime, these "creative sentences," arising from the paternalistic view that the judge or
other agent of the court knows what is best for the defendant, may
result in undesirable, authoritarian invasion of private lives. In focusing on the limits of the criminal law to coerce change consistent
with individual liberty, Morris notes that "[t] he rejection of [the
treatment model] as a part of crime control flows not from lack of
power or competence to influence the criminal's behavior but from
historical evidence about the misuse of power and from more fundamental views of the nature of man and his rights to freedom." 19 Somewhat paradoxically then, the position is here taken that the treatment
model is dangerous to the rights of the offender and that in the guise
of enlightened treatment and rehabilitation the traditional limitations
of justice have been overstepped.
2.

Equaljustice

A second but equally important problem evolving indirectly from
the acceptance of the treatment model is the disparity in sentences for
offenders committing similar crimes. This disparity has been documented and denounced throughout the United States.2 0 One study
involving the federal courts found significant sentence disparity
among individual judges in the same judicial district as well as among
21
those in different geographical areas.
Board of Prison Terms and Paroles Length of Stay of All Persons Paroled 1973 By
Offense, Table VA, January 1976 (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).

19.

N.

20.

See, e.g.,

MORRIS,

supra note 13, at 26.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 145 (1967); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY To

REDUCE CRIME 117 (1973). See generally M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973);
W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING (1974); JUSTICE IN
SENTENCING (L. Orland & H. Tyler eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Orland & Tyler].
21. Orland & Tyler, supra note 20, at 171-76. In cases of postal theft by postal
employees, the percentage of defendants receiving prison sentences from judges in the
same judicial district ranged from 4% by one judge to 50% by another judge. Id. at
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Similar disparity can be found in Washington, where the percentage of defendants committed to prison from the various counties
varies widely.2 2 The convicted criminal is left to devise his own explanation for such disparities and the end result is often to instill in him a
deep sense of the unfairness of the system. 23 Because the primary goal
of the treatment model is rehabilitation, the term served must be determined according to the perceived needs of each offender and not
24
primarily upon consideration of the criminal acts.
The treatment model encourages judges to concentrate on factors
such as family background, job training, education, economic stability, psychiatric diagnosis, and drug or alcohol problems. 2 5 Considera174. The average length of sentence for robbery varied from 66 months in the Western District of New York to 152 months in the Eastern District, and from an average
of 106 months for all robbery sentencing in the First Circuit to 330 months in the
District of Columbia. Id. at 175-76.
22. In 1974, 17.5% of the defendants convicted of felonies in King County were
committed to prison. WASH. DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, OFFICE OF RESEARCH, ADULT CORRECTIONS POPULATIONS DATA 20, 105, June 1975 (copy on file with
the King County Prosecuting Attorney). In the same year, 32% of the felony defendants convicted in Pierce County were so sentenced while in Snohomish County
14% were so sentenced. Id. at 30. 34, 115, 159.
23. As Judge Constance Baker Motley has stated:
It is fair to say that the individualized prison sentence is the first blow to a defendant's integrity and self-esteem in a process which, through the prison and
parole regime, will deal him many more blows before his release. By punishing
the defendant for what he is, rather than for what he has done, some sentencers
loosen what may already be a fragile tie between the defendant and society.
"Law & Order" and the Criminal Justice System, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 259.
269 (1973),
24. The Model Sentencing Act openly rejects differences between offenses as a
primary basis for sentencing.
The Model Sentencing Act diminishes the major source of disparity-sentencing
according to the particular offense . . . It makes available, for the first time, a plan
that allows the sentence to be determined by the defendant's makeup, his potential threat in the future, and other similar factors, with a minimum of variation
according to the offense.
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES, MODEL

SENTENCING ACT 2 (2d ed. 1972). This view apparently formed the basis for a recent

proposal for sentencing reform in Washington. The staff of the Governor's Task Force
on Decision-Making Models in Corrections produced a draft of a statutory sentencing
scheme that treated almost all crimes identically. Governor's Task Force on DecisionMaking Models in Corrections, A Short Analysis of Draft Proposals for Restructuring
of State Sentencing Policies and Procedures, January 1975 (on file with the King
County Prosecuting Attorney); Gardner, Sentencing Act, Final Interim Draft. November 25. 1974 (prepared for the Governor's Task Force on Decision-Making Models in
Corrections; on file with the King County Prosecuting Attorney).
25. See generally Ringold. supra note 2. One commentator has pointed out the
fallacies of this approach:
Punishment is often imposed not so much for the specific offense which the defendant has committed as because of the defendant's social background. his
failure to have a job, or his lack of education. When punishment is imposed in
this manner, it loses its force as a symbol of society's disapproval of the defendant's criminal conduct. Instead, the punishment tells the defendant that so-
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tion of these variables, however, will clearly yield different determinations for defendants who commit the same crime. The convicted
individual with a stable family, a place to stay, and a job may get probation, whereas another man convicted of the same crime and with

a similar criminal background, but from an unstable family and without a job, may be diagnosed as unstable and therefore be sent to
prison. Consideration of such "social" factors by judges can result in
requiring the most drastic forms of rehabilitation for those who come
from the lower socioeconomic levels of society. 26 Thus, not only are
the interests of equal justice ignored by this system, but a practice
that society deplores, discrimination on the basis of race and socioeconomic level, is a partial result.
Another flaw in the concept of individualized justice is that judges,
although internally consistent in making their decisions, differ in their
diagnoses based upon their differing values and philosophies. 2 7 In

1971, the Superior Court Judges Association of Washington sponsored a research project to examine the factors affecting judicial dis-

cretion in felony sentencings. 28 The results of the study "seriously
ciety disapproves of him, that his character is deficient. The defendant knows that
the kind of treatment he receives from the criminal process is not primarily a
function of the crime which he has committed. It is more likely to be a reflection of the judge's estimate of him as a person.
Motley, supra note 23, at 268-69.
26. The Orland & Tyler study yielded the following data: In interstate theft cases,
48% of the black defendants were sentenced to prison, while only 28% of the white
defendants were so sentenced. Similarly for postal theft, the imprisonment rate was
39% for white defendants and 48% for black defendants. During fiscal year 1970,
the average sentence for whites entering federal prisons was 42.9 months, while the
average sentence for black defendants during the same time period was 57.5 months.
Orland & Tyler, supra note 20, at 158-59. Bureau of Census statistics indicate that
31.4% of black persons in the United States were below the low income (poverty)
level in 1974, whereas the comparable figure for white persons was 8.9%, and for all
persons was 11.6%. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table No. 652, at
399 (1975). For an explanation of low income level see id. at 378.
27. See W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING 89 (1974).

At one point Gaylin, a psychiatrist and lawyer who conducted a number of in-depth
interviews with judges, notes:
Judge Garfield is a fair man, as fair as we are likely to find. He will treat all his
charges with equity. But even had he no measure of personal bias (an impossibility), he, in his person, would introduce a depressing inequity into the legal
system, because one must juxtapose his attitude about incarceration against an
unknown Judge Y's. What kind of equity or justice exists in a system where the
luck of location, time of event, or even change of docket-not nature of offense-determines which judge the offender appears before, and, therefore, at
which end of the broad spectrum of potential punishments the deliberation will
begin?
Id. For an example of one judge's sentencing philosophy see Ringold, supra note 2.
28. See Comment, Discretion in Felony Sentencing-A Study of Influencing Factors, 48 WASH. L. REv. 857 (1973).
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challenge the underlying assumption of indeterminate and discretionary sentencing that it is possible to individualize a sentence for a
particular offender." 29 The researchers found that individualized sentences were "directly dependent upon the judge's background and
unconscious biases rather than upon the defendant's needs." 3 0 Such
punishment loses its force as a symbol of society's disapproval and
becomes merely "a reflection of the judge's estimate of him as a
3
person." 1
These inconsistencies undermine fundamental precepts of our legal
system. The Anglo-American judicial tradition has evolved elaborate
rules to determine the circumstances under which a court may exercise its power over the individual in the context of criminal proceedings, i.e., the determination of guilt or innocence. These rules have
been designed to protect the rights of the defendant, to establish firm
limits of power, and to ensure equal justice without bias or prejudice
under the law. This process may be imperfect, but there is at least
general agreement on the principles to be followed and the goals to be
attained. On the issue of the sanctions to be imposed, however, the
court has become a diagnostician, presuming a kind of paternalistic
32
and virtually unlimited authority over the individual.
Not only does the present system fail to protect citizens from possible prejudice and bias in the sentencing decision, but in a deeper
sense it is antithetical to the rule that society will be governed by prescribed law. Although the system does follow the canon nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege-"there can be no crime and no punishment except as a law prescribes it"-with respect to the definition of
crimes, as one commentator states, that standard "is generally ignored
in the portions of the same laws prescribing the range of permissible
punishments. As to the penalty that may be imposed, our laws characteristically leave to the sentencing judge a range of choice that should
be unthinkable in a 'government of laws, not of men.' "33 As Justice
Douglas stated: "'It is unfair to inflict unequal penalties on equally
.' "34
guilty parties.
29.

Id. at 872 (emphasis in original).

30.

Id.

31.
32.

Motley, supra note 23, at 269.
See, e.g., Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions: An Alternative to Offi-

cial Discretionin Sentencing, 62 GEO. L.J. 1 (1973).
33.
M. FRANKEL, supra note 20, at 5.

34.
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B.

The Effectiveness of IndividualizedPunishment

It is not enough to argue on moral and philosophical grounds that
the treatment model is inherently unjust and an infringement on individual freedom; the model must also be dealt with on its own terms.
Advocates of the rehabilitative view of criminal law never claimed
that it would meet the traditional, rather abstract demands of "justice." They argued simply that it would be effective in reducing crime
35
and protecting the public. As one author observed:
The age of therapy deemed itself capable of dispensing with what it
viewed as an anachronistic vestige of retributivism. "Criminals are
sick," claimed the apostles of the new criminology. "They must be
treated, not punished." And treatment, unlike punishment, the argument went, cannot be bounded by considerations of justice. Effectiveness, not fairness, has been the hallmark of this age.
There are two strong indications, however, that the promise of effectiveness in reducing crime has not been met. The first is the dramatic
increase in the crime rate experienced over the last ten years. The
second is a growing number of studies that indicate that the programs
introduced to carry out rehabilitation have generally failed to have
any measurable effect on recidivism rates.
1.

Rising crime rates

The problems involved in interpreting crime rates are numerous.
Published crime rates may be based on unreliable statistics and may
be affected by many social factors.3 6 Changes in the age structure of
the population and trends toward increased urbanization affect crime
incidence. 37 Reporting techniques of police departments and differing
rates of reporting offenses affect crime rates without necessarily rein

Hearings on H.R. 8414 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 29, at 116-17 (1972).
35. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 297 (1974).

36.

Even the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, one of the best official sources of

crime reporting, have been questioned and may be affected by reporting or administrative factors. See, e.g., Zeisel, F.B.I. Statistics-A Detective Story, 59 A.B.AJ. 510

(1973).
37. See, e.g., Ferdinand, Demographic Shifts and Criminality: An Inquiry, 10
BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 169 (1970). S. REID, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY 561-89

(1976).
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flecting the actual increase or decrease in crimes committed. 38 Despite
these technical problems, the statistics do suggest that criminal activity
has increased at a rate greater than can be accounted for by population changes or reporting factors.
From 1965 to 1974 the incidence of robbery in Seattle increased
400 per cent, and both burglary and aggravated assault increased over
300 per cent. 39 While the increase may be explained by improved
reporting procedures, it would then be expected that the murder rate,
the most accurately reported crime, would not follow a similar trend.
This was not the case. Although the percentage increase was not as
dramatic, the murder rate for the same period increased 250 per
40
cent.
One might argue that the increases in crime are the expected result
of a greater number of young people in the population. While this
may explain some of the increase, reports indicate that the increases in
crime are disproportionately large when compared to increases in the
41
youth population.
Admittedly, present crime rates do not give a precisely accurate
measure of the increase in crime. But to acknowledge that crime statistics are inaccurate is not to deny that, taken together and correcting
for factors that tend to affect the figures, they still offer convincing
evidence that crime has increased dramatically in the last 10 years
and that the individualized treatment model has not met its promise
of crime reduction through rehabilitation. This is not to imply that
the policies of treatment and rehabilitation have been directly responsible for the increase in crime; the causes of such an increase are complex and defy simplistic explanations. It does appear, however, that
the present policies are an inappropriate response to a very real and
immediate problem.
38.

See generally

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, TIlE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).

39. Interview with Hal Clausen, Seattle Police Dep't Office of Research. in Seattle.
Wash.. May 1976. The rate per 100,000 for robbery in Seattle increased from 93 in
1965 to 403 in 1974. Id.
40. Id. The murder rate per 100,000 was 4.3 in 1965 and 10.8 in 1974.
41.

See J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 15-20 (1975). Wilson notes a District

of Columbia study indicating that "[w] hile the number of persons between the ages
of sixteen and twenty-one in the District of Columbia increased by 32 percent between
1960 and 1970 ... the rate of serious crime went up by over 400 per cent .... " Id.
at 16. Another study conducted by A. Barnett at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology estimated that "the increase in the murder rate . . . was more than ten times
greater than what one would have expected from the changing age structure of the
population alone." Id. at 17.
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2.

Research evidence

In addition to crime rate data, there is a growing body of research
by sociologists indicating that the rehabilitation programs introduced
during the 1950's and 1960's have had little effect on offender recidivism rates. 42 The most impressive and influential of these reports is
a survey of studies done by Professor Robert Martinson.
The disturbing conclusion of Martinson's first report 43 is that
"[w] ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that
have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism."' 44 In his article, Martinson systematically summarizes the four

major types of "in-prison" treatment programs included in his survey
-educational and vocational training, individual and group counseling, attempts to transform the institutional environment, and medical
treatment-and concludes that they are generally ineffective in reducing recidivism.4 5 Arguably, such findings may indicate that treatment programs outside institutional confines would be a possible and
more viable method for the rehabilitation of offenders. Yet in re-

viewing community milieu therapy and psychotherapy programs,
Martinson found no evidence of a significant reduction in recidivism.

46

42. See, e.g., G. KASSENBAUM, D. WARD & D. WILNER, PRISON TREATMENT AND PAROLE SURVIVAL (1971); D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975)

[hereinafter cited as LIPTON]; Ward, Evaluative Research for Corrections, in PRISONERS IN AMERICA 184 (L. Ohlin ed. 1973); Bailey, CorrectionalOutcome: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 153 (1966); Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of CorrectionalPrograms, 17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 67 (1971).
43. See Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform,
35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Martinson].
Martinson was commissioned in 1966 by the State of New York to assess existing
correctional research and to determine what methods successfully reduced recidivism.
From the body of research surveyed, Martinson discovered only 231 studies containing interpretable findings, i.e., those which had utilized some control group, that had
sufficient samples and provided adequate data and statistical tests from which to draw
conclusions. See LIPTON, supra note 42, at 3-21. Martinson's conclusions were so disturbing that the state not only refused to publish the report, but also refused to give
the author permission to publish it himself. The report first became available to the
public when it was subpoenaed from the state. Martinson, supra, at 23.
The work for some time enjoyed a certain underground reputation among sociologists and finally surfaced in the professional literature in 1974.
44. Martinson, supra note 43, at 25 (emphasis deleted).
45. Id. at 25-36. See also LIPTON, supra note 42, at 184-96, 437-81.
46. Martinson, supra note 43, at 38-40. Of the three major studies of milieu
therapy programs reviewed by Martinson, two concluded that the elaborate programs
produced no significant reduction in recidivism, and the third found that not only was
there no significant improvement, "but that the longer a boy participated in the treat-
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Even more important is Martinson's review of studies which attempted to test the effectiveness of probation by comparing parole
and probation outcomes. In one study probation was found to produce lower recidivism rates than imprisonment for first offenders, but
this improvement disappeared with repeat offenders. 4 7 Another study
found a slight increase in recidivism rates for offenders placed on
probation. 4 8 A more recent study of adult recidivism in Denver also
failed to find support for the belief that offenders who go to prison are
more likely to commit new crimes than are those who receive sentences to probation. 49 Special parole and probation services were also
found not to significantly affect recidivism,5 0 thus answering in part
the argument of judges and professionals who maintain that probation
cannot be effective before the quality is improved and the case loads
reduced.
ment the worse he was likely to do afterward." Id. at 40 (emphasis added). In six
studies of various groups and individual psychotherapy programs administered in the
community, only two projects reported reductions in recidivism rates and these provided no clear indication of a viable approach to crime control. Id. See also LIPTON.
supra note 42, at 438.
47. "[Fl or offenders with one prior felony, and offenders with two or more prior
felonies, there was no significant difference between the violation rates of probationers
and parolees." LIPTON, supra note 42, at 60.
48. A British study compared recidivism rates from a court with a higher than
average use of probation with rates from other jurisdictions. It found a slight but not
statistically significant increase in reconviction rates. Martinson. supra note 43. at 41.
See also LIPTON. supra note 42, at 61. A 1964 Israeli study compared probation sentences with one year prison sentences. In this study "only first offenders under 20
years of age did better on probation; those from 21-45 actually did worse." Martinson, stupra note 43, at 41 (emphasis in original).
49. See DENVER ANTI-CRIME COUNCIL, DENVER HIGH IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM: CHARACTERISTICS AND RECIDIVISM

OF ADULT FELONY OFFENDERS IN DENVER

(1974) (on file with the King County Prosecuting Attorney). The study analyzed recidivism, considering rearrest. reconviction, and reincarceration based on a random
sample of 679 felony offenders convicted between 1968 and 1970. It also calculated
recidivism rates on both a one year and two year follow-up time period. It concluded:
This study provides evidence that probation is a case disposition used most frequently earlier in the offender's criminal career, but is just as likely to result in
failure in terms of recidivism as incarceration. The probability of reconviction
during two years of follow-up was actually higher for probationers than [for]
those incarcerated.
Id. at 164. Such studies indicate that probation as a disposition does not produce
lower recidivism rates.
50.
Martinson reviewed a series of major studies conducted in California to test
the effectiveness of special probationary services by comparing the performance of
offenders given such services with the performance of those subjected to detention
and then released to regular supervision. Martinson. supra note 43. at 42. The reported
findings of the project stated that juveniles who were released directly to probationary
status with extensive probationary services had a significantly lower failure rate than
did identical juveniles who were assigned to regular detention and then released to
supervision. This study has been cited many times to support arguments that probation with intensive supervision and special treatment is more effective than incarcera-
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In essence, Martinson's study suggests that not all treatment programs have failed, but that the successes are isolated and offer no
clear direction for future policymakers interested in reducing recidivism rates. In commenting on the significance of this finding, one
51
observer stated:
Not only have rehabilitative efforts failed to produce appreciable effects on recidivism, but it is highly unlikely that any systematic application of any kind of rehabilitative program will seriously reduce the
recidivism of the offender population to which it may be applied.
The net effect of such research is clear: there is little empirical support
for continued reliance on treatment programs, either in or out of prison, as the answer to the crime problem.
Although these conclusions are not encouraging, those charged with
administering a criminal justice system must attempt to develop effective approaches for dealing with crime. Unfortunately, effective alternatives have been obscured by the prevalence of the rehabilitative
52
model. In making this observation, Martinson hypothesized:
Our present treatment programs are based on a theory of crime as a
"disease"-that is to say, as something foreign and abnormal in the
individual which can presumably be cured. This theory may well be
flawed, in that it overlooks-indeed, denies-both the normality of
crime in society and the personal normality of a very large proportion
of offenders, criminals who are merely responding to the facts and
conditions of our society.
This view of crime as a natural phenomenon suggests the need to
reexamine the rationality of the criminal offender and the effectiveness of deterrence as a method of crime control. The dominance of
the rehabilitative ideal has tended to preclude serious discussion of
tion in preventing recidivism. Martinson found, however, when he re-analyzed the
data that the experimental group in fact had a lower failure rate, but it also had a
lower success rate. When he sought to explain this apparent anomaly, he found that
the lower success rate for the experimental group resulted because its members in fact
committed more offenses than did the control group. The lower failure rate was attributable to probation officers who were using a more lenient revocation policy with
members of the experimental group. Thus, contrary to announced findings, the study
actually demonstrated that those juveniles who received probation with extensive

services committed more crimes. Id. at 44.
51.

J. Conrad, The Lessons of a Little Knowledge 3, December 18-19, 1975

(unpublished paper delivered at conference entitled "The Criminal and Society: Should
We Treat or Punish?"), on file with the Washington Law Review.
52. Martinson, supra note 43, at 49.
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deterrence theory, and has thus neglected the role of punishment in
deterring criminal behavior and reinforcing societal standards of conduct. 53 In light of society's present experience with rehabilitative concepts, it is time for a reexamination of the theory of deterrence.
II.

DETERRENCE REVISITED

The notion of deterrence, burdened as it is with ideological overtones, has until recently been largely ignored in research literature.
Most social scientists have preferred to talk about treatment and rehabilitation while dismissing deterrence as "a derived rationalization of
revenge. "54
The theoretical roots of deterrence can be traced to two classical
theorists, Cesare Becarria and Jeremy Bentham. Becarria, in his remarkable 1764 treatise On Crimes and Punishments,5 5 visualized deterrence as an end to tyranny and unnecessarily severe punishment.
He argued that punishment should be certain rather than severe, and
proportional to the gravity of the offense rather than conditional on
the whims of the executor. It is ironic, considering the reputation of
deterrence theory in recent years, that scholars credit Becarria's treatise with having done more than any other work to end the barbarous
56
practices of the 18th century criminal law.
Deterrence has generally been subdivided into special and general
deterrence. The theory of special deterrence suggests that punishment
of an offender tends to reduce the possibility that he will repeat the
offensive behavior; the focus is on the effects of actual punishment on
the individual deviant. On the other hand, general deterrence refers to
the effects of threatened punishment on society as a whole. 57 Analysis
53. One author, noting that the field of inquiry had been narrowed, wrote:
[1] n no other period has the rehabilitation ideal so completely dominated theoretical and scholarly inquiry, to such an extent that in some quarters it is almost
assumed that matters of treatment and reform of the offender are the only questions worthy of serious attention in the whole field of criminal justice and corrections.
Allen, supra note 16, at 67.
54. H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY
See also F. TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY 478 (1938);
CRIME PROBLEM 508 (4th ed. 1967).
55. See also J. BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT (1830).
56. See Paolucci, Introduction to C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND
(1963). citing H. BARNES & H. BECKER, I SOCIAL THOUGHT FROM

337 (2d ed. 1954).
W. RECKLESS, THE

PUNISHMENTS at ix
LORE TO SCIENCE

551-52 (1952).
57. See Andenaes, General Prevention Revisited: Research and Policy Implications,
66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 338. 341 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Andenaes].
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of these concepts and the effects of incapacitating criminals suggests
their viability in a modern correctional system.
A.

Special Deterrence

Critics of deterrence theory frequently cite the seemingly high recidivism rates of offenders coming out of prison to support the proposition that punishment does not deter crime.5 8 Such data, assuming
their accuracy, suggest only that imprisonment does not deter convicted criminals from committing further crimes. 59 Even this more
limited hypothesis, however, may be challenged.
Careful analysis of recidivism rates does not support the notion that
treatment is necessarily more effective than imprisonment in reducing
recidivism. 60 The notion that most criminals are totally irrational is
unsupported. 61 Criminals may be more rational than society admits;
58. See studies cited in Tittle, Punishment and Deterrence of Deviance, in THE
ECONOMICS oF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 85-86 (Simon Rottenberg ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Tittle].
59. The statement that high recidivism rates indicate that punishment does not
deter crime mistakenly combines general deterrence and special deterrence. As Herbert
Packer has indicated in discussing the two discrete concepts:
These two are quite different although they are often confused in discussion of
problems of punishment. For example, it is sometimes said that a high rate of
repeat offenses, or recidivism as it is technically known, among persons who have
already been once subjected to criminal punishments shows that deterrence does
not work. The fact of recidivism may throw some doubt on the efficacy of special
deterrence, but a moment's reflection will show it says nothing about the effect
of general deterrence.
H. PACKER, supra note 10, at 39 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
60. As one author has noted:
While there are many variations and complexities, the available follow-up data
suggest that instead of the widely believed 65 percent to 85 percent return-toprison rate, only about 35 percent actually return. And, a recent FBI study suggests that legal sanction may be more of a specific deterrent than even the FBI
is willing to admit. By means of arrest reports, all offenders released from custody in 1963 were followed for six years. Although 65 percent were re-arrested
on some charge during the follow-up period, only 23 percent, or 40 percent of
those rearrested during the first four years, had been reconvicted by the end of the
fourth year. Furthermore, extrapolation indicates an overall reconviction rate for
the remainder of the offenders' lives somewhat below 35 percent.
Tittle, supra note 58, at 89 (1973) (footnotes omitted). For statistics on the recidivism
rate for Washington inmates see Comment, supra note 5.
61. James Q. Wilson writes:
There is scarcely any evidence to support the proposition that would-be criminals are indifferent to the risks associated with a proposed course of action.
Criminals may be willing to run greater risks (or they may have a weaker sense
of morality) than the average citizen, but if the expected cost of crime goes up
without a corresponding increase in the expected benefits, then the would-be criminal-unless he or she is among that small fraction of criminals who are utterly
irrational--engages in less crime, just as the average citizen will be less likely to
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and, if the costs of crime are sufficiently high, even criminal repeaters
may be deterred from future criminal activity. The argument that
punishment does not deter criminals presupposes only that socially
and morally acceptable punishments seem ineffective. Society could,
in all probability, design punishment draconian enough to be effective. 62 While it is fortunate that the range of acceptable punishments is
limited, those arguments which declaim the effectiveness of punishment as a special deterrent can be used in support of increasing its
severity as well as in calling for its abandonment.
B.

General Deterrence

Even if it were true that traditional criminal punishments do not
affect recidivism rates, the theory of general deterrence, which emphasizes threatened rather than actual punishment, would not be discredited. The purpose of punishment under this theory is to lend
credibility to the threat of law. 63 The notion seems intuitively correct.
Society's rules, codified in the law, are not obeyed simply because they
coincide with natural desires, but at least partly because people fear
the consequences of disobedience. These fears are in some measure
take a job as a day laborer if the earnings from that occupation, relative to those
from other occupations, go down.
J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 175-76 (1975). See also Martinson, supra note 43;

Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime? 36 PUB. INTEREST 103 (1974); Gunning,
How Profitable is Burglary? in THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 35-38

(1973).
62. Anthony Burgess has outlined an effective mechanism for eliminating deviant
behavior through the use of punishment in a futuristic society. See A. BURGESS, A
CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962).

63. Norwegian scholar Johannes Andenaes underscores the importance of this
point:
General deterrence (or general prevention) is sometimes defined as the restraining
impact which the punishment of offenders has on others. This is an unfortunate
definition, since it concentrates upon actual punishment in isolation from the threat
of the law. The threat of law is the point of departure; from a general deterrence
perspective the main function of actual punishment is to make the threat of the
law credible.
Andenaes, supra note 57, at 342 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). To avoid
confusion which he feels inheres in the term "general deterrence." Andenaes uses
"general prevention." He states:
When objections are made to this definition of general deterrence as the effect
of punishment on others, it is not only because the definition is found to be analytically misleading, but also because it tends to engender a feeling that somebody
is being sacrificed for the purpose of instilling fear in others; that the use of the
deterrence mechanism is. therefore, in some way unjust or improper. While there
are certainly ethical problems involved in deterrence, the answers should not be
biased by the use of inaccurate terminology.
Id. at 343 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
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proportional to the credibility of the threats of punishment attached to
them. Although fhere are complexities and limitations to deterrence
theory, its general validity seems clear. As Morris states: "If the criminal law is not in part a mechanism of deterrence, aiming to inhibit
criminal conduct by the threat and actuality of punishment, why do
64
we keep it at all?"
The difficulty arises in attempting to measure the deterrent, or preventive, impact of punishment. Modern techniques of statistical analysis have now made it possible to control some of the variables related
to crime and to attempt to isolate the relationships between the imposition of sanctions, their severity, and the crime rate. One economist's
study comparing the crime rates among areas having different probabilities of punishment examined 14 crime-related variables and concluded: "[T] he rate of specific crime categories, with virtually no
exception, varies inversely with estimates of the probability of apprehension and punishment by imprisonment. . . and with the average
length of time served in state prisons. '65 In surveying the work of
economists as a whole, one commentator noted: "The evidence convincingly demonstrates that crime rates are reduced by higher proba'6 6
bilities of punishment.
Sociologists using somewhat different techniques have reached similar conclusions. 67 Much of the research has focused on the interrelationship between certainty and severity of punishment as they affect
crime. One author suggests that although it cannot be concluded from
present research that certainty of punishment is effective independent
of its severity, it would appear that "the use of imprisonment acts as a
64. Morris, Forwardto J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE V (1974).
65. I. Ehrlich, Participationin Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521, 545 (1973).

66. M. Silver, Punishment, Deterrence, and Police Effectiveness, A Survey and
Critical Interpretation of the Recent Econometric Literature 30, February 1974 (on
file with the King County Prosecuting Attorney).
67. See, e.g., Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and Deterrence, 48 SOCIAL SCI. Q. 515
(1968); Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 409 (1969);
Gray & Martin, Punishment and Deterrence: Another Analysis of Gibbs' Data, 50
SOCIAL SCI. Q. 389 (1969); Bean & Cushing, Criminal Homicide, Punishment and Deterrence: Methodological and Substantive Reconsiderations, 52 SOCIAL SCI. Q. 277
(1971); Phillips & Votey, Jr., An Economic Analysis of the Deterrent Effect of Law
Enforcement on Criminal Activity, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. (1972); Logan, General
Deterrent Effects of Inprisonment, 51 SOCIAL FORCES 64 (1972). Andenaes notes that,

aside from certain differences in statistical methods, the key distinction between a sociological and economic approach is that economists tend to see crime as an economic
activity, involving rational choice, while the sociologists envision a much more complex
psychology behind deterrence. Andenaes, supra note 57, at 340.
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deterrent for traditional crimes and, secondly that the differences in
the length of imprisonment, at the levels of use in the United States,
68
do not seem to have much impact on crime."
Individually such studies neither conclusively prove the efficacy of
general deterrence theory nor sharply define the interaction between
crime and punishment, but taken as a whole such studies do indicate
an inverse relationship between crime rates and probability of punishment. Deterrence research remains in its early stages and requires
more refinement, particularly in statistical methodology, before a
clear picture of the ramifications of the deterrence process can
emerge. It is presently evident, however, that such a process does, to
some extent, affect crime. Furthermore, one must consider where the
burden of proof lies with such arguments. Although it is an excellent
principle of social science to question assumptions until they are supported by statistical evidence, it does not mean "that we should not
base social policy on that assumption until the scientists have pronounced it confirmed, '' 69 especially when common sense seems to place
the presumption in favor of deterrence theory.
An inherent conflict exists between a sentencing policy that sets
rehabilitation as its primary goal and one that seeks to provide a general deterrent to crime. By focusing upon the causes of crime rather
than condemning the criminal act, the treatment model obscures
moral judgment and makes punishment unpredictable and seemingly
random. No clear message is transmitted to potential offenders. General deterrence, on the other hand, depends upon the certain imposition of an undesired sanction so that others will not take the risk of
such punishment. Furthermore, the consistent application of sanctions
clearly delineates socially acceptable behavior. It is difficult to interpret society's position regarding crime when sanctions are inconsistent
68. Andenaes. supra note 57. at 347 (emphasis in original). Thus, even if no correlation exists between certainty and severity, incarceration does constitute a deterrent.
Other studies reinforce the conclusion that punishment deters crime. One group of
researchers attempted to estimate the relative influence of social factors compared
with the working of the criminal justice system and found that the activities of the
criminal justice system account for about one-third of the variations in crime rates.
Within that one-third, the workings of the police and sentencing stages were found to
have a greater impact on the crime rate than the pretrial and conviction stages. S. KoBRIN, E. HANSEN, S. LUBECK & R. YEAMAN, THE DETERRENT EFFECTIVENESS OF CRIIINAL JUSTICE SANCTION STRATEGIES 257-63 (Public Systems Research Institute, U. So.

Cal. 1972). For a discussion of other categories of research see Andenaes. supra note
57, at 339-40, 344-57.
69.
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or when their imposition implies understanding rather than disapproval.
C.

Effects of Incapacitation

Aside from potential long-term special and general deterrent effects, a system emphasizing more certain punishment could have a
more immediate impact on crime reduction as a result of the incapacitation of offenders. The incapacitation argument postulates with remarkable simplicity that an offender cannot commit crimes, at least in
the society at large, while confined. This argument presupposes that
most serious crime is committed by repeat offenders. A major research project supports this supposition and provides strong evidence
that, in fact, a majority of major crimes are committed by a relatively small number of repeat offenders.70 This study of the criminal
histories of offenders suggests that penalties scaled to the seriousness
of the offenses and to the criminal histories of offenders will result in
the longest confinement for those who create the most serious societal
problem and in a commensurate reduction in the number of crimes
7
committed as a result of their incapacitation. '
The incapacitation and deterrence arguments should not be oversimplified. There are certainly factors other than punishment rates
that affect crime. Society must decide how to get the best return for its
money. Programs dealing with the causes of crime (e.g., welfare and
treatment programs) and provisions for more certain punishment are
not mutually exclusive. But the message as it relates to the sentencing
70. See M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT
(1972). This work, known as the Philadelphia Cohort Study, traced the criminal ca-

reers of all males born in 1945, living in -Philadelphia between their 10th and 18th
birthdays. Of this original cohort of almost 10,000 individuals, it was found that a
group of 627, labeled "chronic recidivists," committed over half the offenses (and approximately two-thirds of the violent offenses) perpetrated by the entire group. Id.
at 105.
71. One study has attempted to estimate this effect in a juvenile context using
Wolfgang's statistics. It concludes that given average incarceration periods of nine
months, the return on crime not committed could be as high as one index crime per
period of incarceration. While stressing the expense of incarceration and the fact that
such prevention would not register dramatically on crime rates, the author notes that
"[t] he number of points and offenses prevented is quite appreciable in terms of all
juvenile offenses ....
Clarke, Setting 'Em Out of Circulation:Does Incarcerationof
Juvenile Offenders Reduce Crime? 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 528, 534 (1974).

The study is encouraging; $1,100 [Clarke's figure] is not an unreasonable price to pay
for prevention of a murder, rape or robbery, particularly if the period of incarceration
can be morally justified by the offender's prior criminal behavior.
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process is clear. The hope for crime reduction, slight as it may be, lies
not in the direction of continued inconsistency, inequality, and ineffectiveness of individualized justice, but in the direction of consistent
and moderate punishment proportional to the seriousness of the
72
crime. As one author notes:
With the collapse of the rehabilitative ideology and the acceptance
of the reality of general prevention, the perspective on criminal law
and law enforcement changes. In my view, rehabilitation as well as
incapacitation has a legitimate place in the criminal justice system, but
the primary foundation is general prevention, combining the components of fear and moral persuasion, and keeping within the limits prescribed by considerations of justice, decency and compassion.
III.
A.

A CONCRETE PROPOSAL
A Statement of Purpose

The lack of clear, uncontradictory, articulated purposes constitutes
one of the greatest flaws in the present scheme of criminal sentencing.
Therefore, any new statutory effort should begin with a definite statement of purpose in order to rectify the present confusion in this vital
area of public policy and, more importantly, to define and rationalize
the use of the state's ultimate power over its citizens.
It is the author's view that the primary purpose of imposing a criminal penalty is to punish the adjudicated offender for his or her proscribed conduct. This is the retributive aim of the law; society extracts
a threatened penalty for failure to comply with its rules. Retribution,
incorporating aspects of deterrence and the limitations of just desert,
primarily involves two significant characteristics. First, and most importantly, it is concerned solely with the past proven criminal behavior of the individual. Secondly, it is closely tied to the concept of
proportionality, which dictates that the punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the offense.
The prevalent confusion of retribution with notions of personal
vengeance and revenge has obscured a fundamental objective of criminal sanctions.

72.
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Unlike vengeance, retribution is imposed by the courts after a guilty
plea, or a trial, in which the accused has been found guilty of committing a crime. Prescribed by the law broken, and proportioned to the

gravity of the offense committed, retribution is not inflicted to gratify
or compensate anyone who suffered a loss.
73
and to vindicate the legal order.

.

.

but to enforce the law

Thus, retribution is distinct from the notion of revenge or vengeance,
74
and its purpose is to uphold and reinforce the legal order.
In addition to recognizing this purpose of the law, a system of sentencing that establishes and enforces penalties primarily based upon
the gravity of the offense can be more humane and less dangerous to
individual freedom than the present system with its focus on identification of the dangerous offender, independent of his crimes, and on
his rehabilitation. Neither of the objectives of the present rehabilitative system provides a basis upon which to determine appropriate
punishments nor do they suffice to justify its imposition. Both notions
leave open the possibility of dispensing punishment above what is deserved by the crime or below what is rightfully expected by the society.75 On the other hand, a system providing greater certainty of
punishment would both reduce the existent inequities of the individualized treatment model and acknowledge society's rightful interest in
retribution.
Recognizing these considerations, the following proposal envisions
a utilitarian model, premised primarily on considerations of deterrence-working strictly within (and limited by) the framework of a
73. E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 11 (1975) (emphasis added).
74. This aim of criminal sanctions has long been recognized. Hobbes wrote,
"[C] ovenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man
at all." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946). Van den Haag reflects
this thinking as well:
The laws legislated by society are not self-enforcing. They become effective
only when society does for them what nature does for its laws . . . or inflicts
punishment, which makes defying them dangerous, disadvantageous, painful, and,
above all, odious.
Van den Haag, supra note 73, at 19. In this author's view, it is not a mark of inhumanity to expect lawbreakers to suffer for their crimes. Much of the recent dissatisfaction with sentencing practices stems from the fact that society has denied the
legitimacy of retributive justice. The concept of "just desert," see note 12 4upra, indicates that society may expect a wrongdoer to suffer in proportion to his or her crime.
This does not mean that personal revenge against the wrongdoer need be a factor.
75. This does not mean that rehabilitation and the isolation of dangerous offenders
are not desirable effects of punishment; they are legitimate goals, but only when the
nature and degree of the punishment are first established on the basis of what is deserved by the criminal behavior.
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moral model based on considerations of proportionality and desert.
Common sense suggests the efficacy of a system based upon deserved
punishment. Such a system should not have only a general deterrent
effect but, more importantly, should be fairer than the existing one.
Deserved punishment treats individuals equally and fairly, yet recognizes the common expectation that criminal conduct will be punished. At the same time, it rejects any notion of personal vendetta and
limits punishment to what society considers fair in relation to the seriousness of the crime. In addition, this philosophy of sentencing will
enable the system to send out a clear and unambiguous signal that
convicted offenders will be punished, rather than the weak and confusing signal transmitted by the present system. In contrast with current sentencing practices that have given rise to public disenchantment, a sentencing policy based on deserved punishment should enjoy
broad public support because it is based upon commonly understood
precepts.
B.

Dealing with Discretion

Washington has fully embraced the indeterminate sentencing
system with its allowance of broad discretion in the hands of those
who sentence and its narrow judicial review of correctional decisions. 76 This broad discretion is essential to the operation of indeterminate sentencing, and it is this dependence that makes the current
system vulnerable to criticism.
Any proposal to abandon the indeterminate sentence raises the
issue of dealing with discretion. Two of the alternatives now being
discussed are mandatory minimum terms 77 and so-called "flat sen-

76. The Washington judge may commit the convicted offender to a state institution
or county jail, stay or suspend the sentence, or place him on probation. See WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 9.92.010-.030, 9.92.050-.060, 9.95.200 (1974). After commitment to
a state institution, the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles will determine a minimum
sentence and may release the offender prior to the expiration of his maximum term.
See id. ch. 9.95. The Board's decision is not subject to judicial review, although the
determination of the trial court may be reviewed if the record fails to reveal a basis
for the exercise of the court's discretion and it can be said that "no reasonable man
would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Hurst, 5 Wn. App. 146. 148.
486 P.2d 1136, 1138 (1971). See also State v. Douglass. 66 Wash. 71, 118 P. 915
(1911).
77. See, e.g., S.B. 2698. 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975).
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tencing. 7 8s Washington is familiar with the former, as present law
mandates minimum terms for certain cases of repeat drug sale offenses,7 9 felonies committed while using a firearm,8 0 and rape. 8 In
flat sentencing, the legislature sets a specific sentence for each crime
which the judge must impose. President Ford has called for study of
82
this alternative as a method to eliminate federal sentencing disparities.
The most serious fallacy in these proposals is their over-response to
problems of excessive discretion. The solution is not to abandon discretion altogether, but to bring it under control: to regularize, channel, and structure it. Discretion exists because no one can forsee every
possibility. Even if it were possible to prohibit the exercise of discretion, it would be unwise to do S0.83 It is beyond society's collective
competence to define prospectively specific rules which will always
serve justice when viewed retrospectively. Acknowledging the need for
discretion, however, does not require abandoning the rule of law. A
balance must be struck. 84 The key to attaining this essential balance is
78. See, e.g., Illinois Law Enforcement' Comm'n, Proposal: Reestablishment ot
Determinate Sentencing 24, January 23, 1975 (proposed amendment to ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38 §§ 1001 et seq.; copy on file with the King County Prosecuting Attorney); S.B.

42, Calif., Regular Sess. (1974); S.B. 253, Fla., Regular Sess. (1976).
79.

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.410(2), (3) (1974).

80. Id. § 9.41.025.
81. Id. § 9.79.170(2) (Supp. 1975) (three year minimum term for rape in the
first degree).
82. Address by President Ford, Yale Sesquicentennial Convocation Dinner, April
25, 1975 (copy on file with Washington Law Review).
83. When attempts are made to eliminate discretion by statutes, the results are
frequently far from what was intended. Discretion does not disappear but rather is
internalized or is transferred to other decision makers who are not prohibited from
exercising it, thereby frequently increasing their power. See generally D. NEWMAN,
CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL, 112-30,

178-84(1966).
84. In his seminal work, Kenneth Culp Davis effectively makes this point:
Discretion is a tool, indispensable for individualization of justice. All governments in history have been governments of laws and of men. Rules alone, untempered by discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modern government
and of modern justice. Discretion is our principal source of creativeness in government and in law.
Yet every truth extolling discretion may be matched by a truth about its dangers: Discretion is a tool only when properly used; like an axe, it can be a weapon
for mayhem or murder. In a government of men and of laws, the portion that is
a government of men, like a malignant cancer, often tends to stifle the portion
that is government of laws. Perhaps nine-tenths of injustice in our legal system
flows from discretion and perhaps only one-tenth from rules.
And every truth warning of dangers or harms from discretion may be matched
by a truth about the need for and the benefits from discretion.
Let us not overemphasize either the need for discretion or its dangers; let us
emphasize both the need for discretion and its dangers.
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 25 (1969).
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the creation of a legal structure for sentencing which openly acknowledges and accepts discretion but confines its use within boundaries set
by law. Its essence is to view discretion as the ability to vary, with
proper justification, from the norm created by law, but to allow review of those variations.
1.

Establishment of ranges of authorizedpunishment

The legislature should establish a standard or presumptive sentence
surrounded by a range of authorized variations to guide judges in sentencing. 8 5 These sentences would be determined by the nature of the
particular crime and the criminal history of the defendant. 86 Judges
would be authorized to depart from the standard or presumptive sentence to the extent allowed by the surrounding range, only if specific
legislatively defined aggravating or mitigating factors were found to

85. It is not necessary, and, in fact, it may be undesirable for the legislature itself
to undertake the detailed task of drafting these sentences and ranges. Any delegation.
however, must be subject to the continuing review of the legislature. Determining the
appropriate punishment for criminal behavior is clearly a legislative function in a free
and democratic society. For a recommended mechanism to implement such ranges see
note 90 and accompanying text infra.
86. Norval Morris argues that the notion of increasing penalties for repeat offenders is justified by a combination of retributive and deterrence theories. He argues
that the measure of deserved punishment is a product of our experience. Thus he
writes: "Fear may well condition the retributive upper price a community places on a
given crime ....
It looks backward to what has been done by others or to the brutal
or mitigating details of what this criminal has done." N. MORRIS. supra note 13. at 76.
But he also employs general deterrent aims as a justification of increasing penalties:
"[T] he criminal law must keep its retributive promises. although it need not be precipitate in moving to its heavy weaponry." Id. at 80.
Society has a greater fear of (or perhaps anger toward) multiple offenders and
therefore demands a higher retributive price with each repeat offense. Andrew von
Hirsch sees the concept as an element of desert in that the offender is more culpable
and therefore more deserving of punishment. DOING JUSTICE 85 (1976). Without trying to resolve this philosophical problem. it seems clear that not only does such a
practice meet the test of "fairness" (whether it derives from the notion that the first
offender "deserves" leniency or that the multiple offender "deserves" severity), but it
is also compelled by the utilitarian need to protect ourselves against those who have
demonstrated a propensity to repeat their offenses. Society will continue to attempt
predictions of future criminal behavior, but these predictions must be based solely on
factors related to the offender's past criminal behavior. Although the offender's age.
sex, race, employment status, and drinking habits may be useful indicators of the
likelihood of recidivism, they are not criminal states or acts and therefore must not
become a basis for imposing punishments. The prior criminal record does provide
some indication of the likelihood of future behavior; and even though it may not be
the most accurate indicator, it at least has the virtue of allowing the offender to define
himself by his acts and maintains the essential connection between punishment and
crime while pursuing the goal of community protection.
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exist.87 The ranges would allow variation as to each element of the
presumptive sentence but within a relatively narrow degree. The punishment prescribed would primarily be "loss of liberty," 88 a phrase
that would be defined as the physical custody of an individual for a
substantial portion of every day, with release from custody allowed
only for certain delineated reasons such as work or education.
The initial establishment of the presumptive sentence for each
crime will be a difficult but important task. The legislature, after ordering crimes by their seriousness (a task it has largely accomplished
in the new criminal code),8 9 should mandate that an existing or newly
created administrative body undertake the task of establishing detailed
sentence ranges within the legislatively defined priorities. 90 The administrative proposals would be presented to the legislature for adoption, modification, or rejection. If no action were taken, they would
automatically go into effect.
In addition, this body should be required to review periodically the
prescribed sentence ranges and to prepare appropriate modification
for the legislature. This approach would allow gradual evolution of
the ranges in keeping with changes in the attitudes of society, while
preserving the democratic control which is fundamental in our society.
2.

Exceptions

Under the system proposed herein, there must be a process to allow
for sentences outside the prescribed ranges. Although several possibili87. The presence of aggravating or mitigating factors would be determined at a
sentencing hearing.
88. Other forms of punishment would not be excluded under this proposal, but in
dealing with serious crime, loss of liberty seems the fairest and most appropriate punishment. The use of monetary fines raises problems of dealing equally with defendants

who have committed the same crimes. Obviously a $1,000 fine is a far different punishment to a person earning $100 a week than for one earning $1,000 a week. There may
be methods to equalize this disparate effect by calculating fines in terms of days of
labor and by basing the amount of the fine on the amount of the loss or gain involved
in the crime. See WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.20.020-.030 (Supp. 1975).
In appropriate cases, restitution would be required, but not as punishment. Restitution represents an obligation to the victim for the damages inflicted, wholly independent of the punishment deserved. Discharge of this private debt-does not discharge
the public debt created by the violation of the criminal law and vice versa.
89. See generally id. tit. 9A.
90. States have introduced comprehensive mandatory minimums or flat sentencing
by adopting time periods in the initial legislation. See, e.g., note 78 supra. Nevertheless, it is this author's view that this approach would focus debate on the specific time

periods rather than on the procedural structure itself and thus would be undesirable.
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ties for regulating such exceptions exist, 9 1 it is the author's belief that
the simplest and most effective system would be to require two preconditions to allowance of a sentencing exception. These requirements would be:
(1) A statement of reasons for the exception by the sentencing judge;
(2) Review by a designated administrative tribunal at the request of
either the defendant or the prosecutor.

Together these prerequisites would provide the requisite flexibility
without sacrificing necessary certainty and consistency in sentencing.
The requirement of enumerated reasons for an exception is essential to test adequately the validity of a sentence that varies from the
established norm.9 2 Allowing discretionary variance from the prescribed ranges without requiring reasons and review would be inviting
return to the present system of excessive individual discretion.
The proposed sentence review mechanism would not consist of a
traditional system of judicial review. All systems of appellate review
recently implemented or proposed 93 utilize traditional judicial review,
either by the general appellate courts,9 4 by a special appellate panel
which hears only sentence appeals, 95 or by a panel of trial court
judges with appellate powers. 96 It is the author's view that the respon91. Other possibilities for dealing with variations from the norm include variations
on the sentencing panel concept. For example, a judge desiring to sentence outside the
prescribed range could be required to convene a panel of three judges. with the concurrence of two of the three being necessary to allow the exception. Although such a
requirement would be a substantial improvement over our present system, it has a
number of problems. First, it would not foster the development of a common law of
sentencing, as would an administrative appellate tribunal. Secondly. it would raise
the problem of undue deference to the original judge. Thirdly, it would be impractical
in the 22 judicial districts in Washington that have fewer than three judges. See WASf.
REV. CODE §§ 2.08.061-.065 (1974).
92. The author can attest to the effectiveness of requiring written reasons as a barrier to arbitrary decisions. Since 1971. the author has required that every deputy prosecuting attorney who declines prosecution on a case state his reasons for that decision
in writing. A copy is given to the law enforcement agency that presented the case. and
a copy is filed after it is reviewed in our office. Law enforcement agencies use the statement as the basis for review of the decline decision via the chain of command of the
Criminal Division. This requirement has had a salutory effect. both in regularizing
the exercise of this important part of prosecutorial discretion and in minimizing the
misunderstanding and resentment that inevitably result when one person or agency
passes judgment on the work of another. See also Korbakes. Criminal Sentencing:
Should the "Judge's Sound Discretion' be Explained? 59 JUDICATURE 185 (1975).
93. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 67-83
(Approved Draft 1968).
94.

See, e.g., ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(1975).

95.
96.

See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 2141 etseq. (Supp. 1975).
See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 §§ 645JA-JG (1976).
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sibility for review of sentences should be placed on the same administrative agency that was responsible for creating the initial presumptive
97
sentence and ranges, rather than on the traditional appellate system.
Several reasons support this allocation of responsibility. First, the type
of review envisioned, applying legislatively articulated sentencing philosophy to a particular set of facts, is not strictly "legal" in nature and
could be more readily accomplished by an agency which would represent a broader range of societal values than would any appellate court.
Secondly, a nonjudicial reviewing tribunal would not be encumbered
by the barnacles of traditional judicial review procedures. Meaningful
sentence review must be immediate; allowing months and sometimes
years to pass before the process is c6mplete would defeat the purposes
of reviewY8 The new system should require no more than 30 days to
complete review of a sentence. 99
Under this system, both the defendant and the state1 00 would have
97. Appellate review within the administrative structure would survive a constitutional test, if there were a right of access to the appellate courts for review of errors of
law after exhaustion of the administrative procedure. Washington's administrative procedure for indeterminate sentencing has been held not to be a delegation of judicial
power. State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 66 P.2d 360 (1937); Ex parte Behrens, 55 F.
Supp. 460 (E.D. Wash. 1944). The proposed system here should similarly be upheld.
98. In 1975, the average judicial appeal in the Washington courts of appeal and
the supreme court took more than 12 months to complete. See Wash. Office of Administrator for the Courts, Nineteenth Ann. Rep. Relating to Judicial Administration
in the Courts 1975, at 27 (on file with the King County Prosecuting Attorney).
99. In order to accomplish review within this time frame, only material presented
to the sentencing judge should be considered by the administrative tribunal. In addition, counsel should be permitted to present only oral argument rather than written
briefs. Finally, review could be provided by traveling panels of the tribunal in the
judicial district where the sentence was imposed.
100. This would ensure that the too lenient, as well as the too severe, sentence is
subject to review. There may be argument, however, that such a provision violates the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. This issue in this particular context
would appear to be one of first impression. The Supreme Court in United States v.
Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931), was confronted with the question of whether a federal
district court had power to shorten a defendant's prison term after it had already imposed a term which the defendant had begun to serve. Answering in the affirmative,
the Court in dictum distinguished the situation in which a court could amend a sentence upward. It stated:
"For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one trial
if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict? Why
is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, he can never be tried again for
that offence? Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being a second time
found guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the second conviction
which is the real danger guarded against by the Constitution. . ..
"The argument seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished
for the same offence as from being twice tried for it."
282 U.S. at 308, quoting In re Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874).
There appear to be two methods by which the force of the above dictum can be dis-
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the right to seek review only of sentences imposed outside the prescribed ranges. Thus, the sentencing judge's power to vary from the
standards would always be subject to review, and the administrative
tribunal would not be overwhelmed by appeals. In cases of review, the
tribunal would be limited to either affirming the exception made by
the sentencing judge or substituting a sentence within the prescribed
range. The purpose of this review would be to ensure compliance with
the legislative scheme, not to provide for resentencing. The tribunal
would be required to articulate reasons for its decisions and would

sipated or found inapplicable to the statutory scheme suggested in the text. The first is
suggested by State v. Brunn, 22 Wn. 2d 120, 154 P.2d 826 (1945). in which the
Washington Supreme Court commented extensively on WASH. CoNsr. art. I, § 9. which
provides: "No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." The
court in Brunn approved of Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Kepner v. United
States. 195 U.S. 100 (1904), in which the argument was put forth that the verdict of
a jury (or determination of guilt by ajudge) need not be the end of a trial for:
[I] t is within the legislative power to prescribe the method by which guilt or innocence shall be established with finality [and] the legislature may provide that
the trial may be continued in a reviewing court in order to insure that the final
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence is free from legal error.
22 Wn. 2d at 130, 154 P.2d at 831. The right of the legislature to prescribe the manner in which persons charged with crimes are to be tried is limited by due process and
right to jury trial considerations, but outside such constitutional limitations "its power
to regulate the criminal procedure is plenary." Id. at 140. 154 P.2d at 836. Whereas
the Constitution does not mandate the exact form of trial procedures required of every
state, if Washington statutes identified review by an administrative body as necessary
for finality of judgment in certain circumstances, jeopardy would not attach prior to
such review and the mandate of the state and federal constitutions would not be violated.
Alternatively, the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Wilson. 420
U.S. 332 (1975), suggests that the double jeopardy clause will not be violated by an
appeal by the government if a retrial of the case is not required. In Wilson, the defendant was indicted and prosecuted for embezzling funds and was found guilty by
jury verdict. The federal district court dismissed the indictment on the ground of
prejudicial pre-indictment delay and the government sought to appeal. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the double jeopardy clause barred review. The
U.S. Supreme Court. 7-2, reversed. The appeal was brought under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1970. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970). which the Court interpreted as an act
by Congress to remove all statutory bars to government appeals wherever the Constitution permitted. Looking to the history of the adoption of the double jeopardy
clause, the Court concluded that government appeals were barred only where there
was danger of subjecting the defendant to a second trial for the same offense- thus.
the protection would not attach to a post-verdict correction of an error of law which
would not grant the prosecution a new trial or subject the defendant to multiple prosecution. The scheme contemplated in the body of the text would not require a retrial
at the sentence review stage but only brief examination of one discrete issue, based on
the evidence already gathered at the trial stage. See note 99 supra. Thus. the defendant
would not be twice tried or punished because all proceedings would be extensions of
the first trial process, and in no event would the defendant receive a punishment increased beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum for the specific crime for which he
was convicted.
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thus develop a body of precedents to guide sentencing judges in exercising their discretion to vary from the prescribed ranges.' 0 '
A sentencing system built on articulated reasons and on review of
exceptions would provide the basis for a truly rational system of criminal sentencing. It would allow the limited flexibility necessary to deal
with exceptional cases, while placing firm constraints on variations to
prevent the exceptions from consuming the rules.
3.

Effect on police and prosecutorialdiscretion

It may be argued that the net effect of this proposal will not be to
control and regularize discretion, but to shift it to an earlier point in
the criminal process where it will continue to be exercised by the police and prosecutors. Any system will be frustrated by the failure of
police to arrest and prosecutors to prosecute. The control of these
"low visibility"'10 2 decisions is complex and difficult; some observations and suggestions, however, can be made.
One of the major reasons for the exercise of the most important
discretionary power of police and prosecutors-the power not to arrest and not to prosecute-is the desire to avoid what are perceived to
be unduly harsh consequences that would follow from an arrest or
04
prosecution.' 03 Washington's adoption of a new criminal code,
which attempts to conform the substantive criminal law to modern
values, will do much to avoid the perceived need for such negative decisions. Similarly, the adoption of moderate and proportional sentencing reform can substantially reduce the pressures on the police
and prosecutors to use their discretionary powers to ameliorate harsh
results. 05

101. The test to be used by the tribunal in determining whether to overrule the
sentencing judge could either be prescribed in the original statute or developed as part
of the "common law" of sentencing.
102. See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE LJ. 543 (1960).

103.

See

F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A

CRIME 186-90, 207-12 (1969); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF
GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 112-25, 177-82 (1966).
104. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 9A (Supp. 1975).
105. Beccaria, addressing this issue in 1764 wrote: "[O]ne ought to consider that
clemancy is a virtue of the legislators and not of the executors of the laws, that it
ought to shine in the code itself rather than in the particular judgments." C. BECCARIA,
supra note 56, at 59.
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The fundamental solution is to subject the exercise of discretion to
rules through the process of internal rulemaking.' 0 6 Whether these
rules are required by the courts,' 0 7 by the legislature, or are generated
internally is less important than that they be developed. For too long
those charged with the power to decide who is to be arrested and who
is to be prosecuted have failed to take the initiative to articulate the
standards upon which they exercise that discretion. 108 The legislature
should require that prosecutorial and police agencies develop and
publish standards governing the exercise of their discretion. t0 9 Such a
106. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
(1969); Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972); McGowan, Rule-making and
the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972); Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of
the Police, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 703 (1974); Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1971).
107. Professor Davis formulates a theory that would modify the traditional nondelegation doctrine of administrative law to require that when the legislature fails to
prescribe meaningful standards for the exercise of discretion, the administrators would
be required to prescribe the standards within a reasonable time. K. DAVIS. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 57-59 (1969). In his article on rule-making
for police Davis articulates a due process right: "Any administrator with unguarded
discretionary power violates due process if he fails to confine and structure his discretion to the extent required to avoid unnecessary arbitrariness in the choices made."
Davis. An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 703. 708 (1974).
108. Over the past year this author's office has undertaken the task of developing
and promulgating standards governing the way in which discretionary decisions relating to changing and disposition of cases are made. See, e.g., King County Prosecuting Attorney, Standard Operating Procedure, §§ 1050-55. Sept. 15, 1975. These
standards deal with both the charging and the disposition of the cases handled. For
example, they govern when certain charges will be reduced and also what sentence
recommendations will be made. Exceptions from the standards are allowed but must
be based on written reasons and approved by supervising deputies. As Judge McGowan
points out: "There is something about the very process of having to write down on
paper detailed guidelines for one's conduct which summons rationality and elevates
principle." McGowan, supra note 106, at 680. See generally F. MILLER, PROSECUTION:
THE DECISION TO CHARGE A CRIME 186-90, 207-12 (1969); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION:
THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 112-25. 177-82 (1966).
109. A major reason for reluctance on the part of police chiefs and prosecutors
to promulgate standards is the fear that the standards will be the basis for external
agencies-mainly the courts-to intervene in what has previously been an area without external supervision. It seems probable that once standards are promulgated.
courts will require agencies to follow them. See, e.g., Billiteri v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 400 F. Supp. 402 (W.D.N.Y. 1975). This should not be cause for concern.
however, since administrators arguably should want their agencies to follow internally
promulgated rules.
Additionally such agencies have not been as free from external supervision as is
often believed. Police decisions are subject to review by prosecutors and later by the
courts. Prosecutors are subject to control by the courts, both on a case-by-case basis
and more broadly under ethical rules. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 7, DR 7-103. Even the negative decision to terminate prosecution cannot be made solely by a prosecutor. The common law rule giving a prosecutor the
unreviewable right to dismiss a pending case has been abolished and prosecutors are
now required to obtain permission of the court before dismissal. See WASH. SUPER. CT.

560

Proposal for Criminal Sentencing
requirement would help ensure that essential reforms of the sentencing
process are not dissipated by uncontrolled police and prosecutorial
discretion.
C.

Rehabilitationand Release

In addition to prescribing punishment, the new scheme must deal
with rehabilitation and the method by which a person being punished
will be returned to society. As suggested earlier, rehabilitation is often
sees as the purpose of the .sentence and hence as coercive rather than
facilitative. Similarly, the imprisonment duration is presently determined by the dubious process of attempting to predict the likelihood
of criminal behavior in the community through observation of the
prisoner's response to the prison environment.
To respond to these difficulties, a new approach is necessary.
Initially, the term of the sentence should be fixed in advance so that
the defendant will know from the outset how long he or she will be
subject to the control of the state. "Control of the state" would not
require that the entire period be spent in a total confinement facility.
Instead, a graduated release plan could be adopted with the first portion of the sentence served in a total loss of liberty facility, 110 the
second portion in a partial confinement facility,"' and the final portion in the community under restrictions similar to present parole
conditions. Violation of conditions in the second or third stages would
result in return to total custody but in no event for a longer period
than that fixed in the original sentence. Conversely, successful performance of any stage would not be a basis for a reduction in length
of sentence.
In this way, rehabilitation could be facilitated within the framework of a certainty of punishment model. Defendants would know
their exact status at all times and yet be without incentive to engage in
CRIM.

R. 8.3(a), superseding Act of March 22, 1909, ch. 249, § 62, [1909] Wash.

Laws 908 (codified at

WASH.

REV.

CODE

§ 10.46.090 (1974)); State v. Sonneland, 80

Wn. 2d 343, 494 P.2d 469 (1972), construing Act of March 22, 1909, ch. 249, § 62,
[1909] Wash. Laws 908.

110. This would include the traditional penitentiary and jail-type facility but would
also include the "mini-prison" and other governmentally operated institutions regardless of their security classifications.
111. This would include work or education release programs and the myriad of
residential rehabilitation programs. Privately operated programs could qualify if they

were subject to state-imposed standards and inspections.
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the dramatic acts which so often characterize attempts to convince
parole boards that rehabilitation has taken place. 1 2 The opportunity
for gradual reentry into society would exist because the defendant is
entitled to it, but not because he or she has earned it.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The present model of sentencing has failed in four ways. First, by
attempting to design sentences to fit the rehabilitative needs and prospects of the offender, the limits of the coercive power of the state over
the individual are not defined. Secondly, the treatment model depends
on individualization and disparity in sentencing which is in direct
conflict with our sense of fairness and equality of justice. Thirdly,
aside from moral arguments, the treatment model has failed to fulfill
its own promise of effectively "curing criminals." Finally, the present
sentencing policy undermines the credibility and thus the deterrent
effect of the threat of law.
The need to determine the limits of the criminal sanction calls for a
return to certain moral considerations. The limits of coercive power
are not to be found in medical analogies and tests of effectiveness, but
rather in the principles of proportionality and desert. While the concept of desert alone may not suffice as a justification for punishment,
it does serve as a guide in setting limits to its severity and distribution.
The criminal justice system need not always impose the maximum
deserved punishment, but it must never impose more than what is deserved by the criminal activity of the offender. While the setting of
maximum penalties can answer some of the criticisms, establishment
of certain prescribed minimum limits is also necessary. It is not true
that the exercise of leniency is never a cause of injustice, because "the
'1 13
power to be lenient is the power to discriminate."
The proposal presented in this article attempts to reincorporate
these principles into the sentencing process. In addition to its theoretical justification, however, this proposal should have a practical effect.

112. For a discussion of the problems created by a parole system which requires
inmates to participate in certain programs to obtain early release see Meyerson. The
Board of Prison Terms and Paroles and Indeterminate Sentencing: A Critique, 51
WASH. L. REV.
(1976).
113. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 170 (1969).
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Both the evidence of the failure of the treatment model to reduce recidivism rates and the evidence of deterrefice research suggest that a
sentencing policy which sets punishments according to the seriousness
of the crime and the criminal record and imposes those sentences with
reasonable certainty would be more effective in controlling crime than
our present system.
The solution proposed here is of necessity in outline form. Numerous details remain to be resolved, but the presentation of a philosophical framework in which they can be resolved should be useful.
Problems permeate the entire criminal justice system, not merely one
agency or discipline. Just as it is impossible to fix responsibility for the
adoption of the individualized treatment model, so it is impossible to
assign responsibility for reform to any one portion of our system. If
there is to be reform, all parts of the system must accept the responsibility to analyze their roles, modify old doctrines, and adopt new policies when their present practices are found wanting.
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